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A Discussion with Edward Bond 
Kourosh Gohar, Suzanne Kim, and Ian Stuart 
(This interview was given at Edward Bond's home in Cambridge on December 
19, 1996.) 
Can you discuss the uses of the imagination?1 
I think we are formed by our early experiences. We are not captured by them but 
our imagination is structured when we are young. And, I think, in a very 
dramatic way. Children map the world in dramatic, extreme terms. So for 
children there is not a practical distinction between what you practically have to 
do in order to survive and live and your imaginative life, which is in many ways 
the interpretation of that practical life. There is no division between the 
imaginative world and the practical world for children. They interpret the 
practical world in imaginative and dramatic terms. Basically I think the mind is 
a theatre. As children get older and involved in the practical affairs of life it 
means that everything collapses down to rationalistic, schematic things. But the 
imaginative world is still around them. Unfortunately, it's no longer theirs. 
People always think that if you are dealing with your imagination you are 
somehow expressing yourself. With adults imagination is the way in which they 
are denied themselves and so their imagination takes on a life of its own and 
becomes collective and obscene and dangerous. That's why wars and ideologies 
are possible. 
You can never say of any human activity "That's it." All human activities are 
over determined. They have a rational component, an ideological component, an 
economic component and you chase round trying to sort out which is the one that 
really determines what you are doing. The only thing you can say is that none of 
them could exist without the other. In a way it is idle to say what is the final 
determinant because they coexist. What is the most important thing for the fish? 
The sea or its fins? It's an idle question. In the last resort you can say it's the 
Kourosh Gohar is artistic director of the Los Angeles-based theatre group Tuesday 
Laboratory; Suzanne Kim lives in New York; Ian Stuart is currently assistant professor in the School 
of Theatre, University of Southern California, and author of Politics in Performance: The Production 
Work of Edward Bond, 1978-1990 (New York: Peter Lang, 1996). 
58 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
ocean that counts. But when people say the last resort they really mean the first 
resort. 
Children are criticised because they have no imagination and then five minutes 
later they are being criticised because they have too much imagination. We don't 
really understand what the imagination is. Children have to exercise their 
imagination because they couldn't make sense of the world otherwise. 
The imagination of the child is much freer to judge accurately than the 
imagination of the adult. By the time you get to adulthood necessity becomes 
much more important. The child is in a very political situation. It's in the power 
of others, it's fed and clothed and so on. Nobody does this for adults. Adults 
have to become practical—they have to have a practical relationship to the world. 
But they can't just jettison their imagination. Every part of my body changes 
every seven years but my mind, my imagination, stay the same. My foot is no 
longer mine after seven years. But my imagination is always mine—I cannot get 
away from it. For the child, the imagination forms a creative function. For the 
adult it becomes a much more practical activity. It becomes not a question of 
creativity but of belief or conviction. It is incorporated into the patterns of 
necessity. And then imagination becomes the way you are owned by your 
society. A child is afraid of its world; an adult is afraid of himself or herself. 
Imagination is owned by the social order, by nationalism, by patriotism, by 
racism, by religions, by all sorts of cultural forms of possession in that way. 
Very few people sincerely believe that two and two are five. Because it makes 
no sense. No use. Therefore practical reality is a guide. It is very easy for one 
race to believe that another race is less human than the first race. And this is like 
saying two and two are five. Society would cease to function if many people 
went round saying two and two are five and others said no, it's four. 
Imagination unites both the functional and the creative. This is its strength and 
weakness because it means that imagination must always change the world—but 
it may do this either creatively or corruptly—which, is a political matter. 
Ultimately, imagination is the desire for justice—but when reason distorts our 
relation to the world, imagination is corrupted. 
My theatre is not called a theatre of imagination because I know that is open to 
abuse. It's called a theatre of reason. Because, in the end, what drama is trying 
to do is close the gap between reason and imagination. 
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Stanisiavsky is the inheritor of the romantics and Brecht is the inheritor of the 
enlightenment. Both inherit this split between reason and imagination. It is only 
when those two things acknowledge each other and reflect a common reality—and 
human beings do this by accepting responsibility for that situation—that human 
beings can become human. I want to create in theatre situations where people are 
required to test that ambiguity between reason and emotion and not find either of 
those as an excuse or explanation for what they do and have to accept 
responsibility for that relationship. There are disasters in the world because 
people don't accept responsibility for what it would mean to be a human being. 
Instead it's always socio-biology, the country, or God, or something like that. It's 
never a self-responsibility. 
If I could write plays that would set up those situations, that would put audiences 
in situations where they were stretched in that way and have to ask the meaning 
of what they were watching, and the meaning of their involvement in it, and 
because of that the meaning of their relationship to society, how they 
participate—if I could write plays that were doing that and work out the proper 
aesthetics for acting that, then I think we would have a workable, rational theatre. 
But what happens now is our theatre is totally stereotyped, formulaic. It never 
says "What is justice?" it says "Whodunit?" This is not good for us. Two and 
a half thousand years ago the Greek theatre was concerned with justice. It's an 
ability we have lost and I don't think you can be human if you don't question the 
meaning of those ultimate determinants which you have always handed over to 
authority. 
You can never hand over moral responsibility to authority. If you abdicate that 
then you enter into a state of fear. That is irrational and can become corrupt in 
various ways. 
Would you describe the T[heatre] E[vent]?2 
In writing plays I try to close the gap between imagination and reason. To do that 
you have to have a theatre that aggravates both of those things. The T[heatre] 
E[vent]s are built in the gap between imagination and reason. Normally it is 
assumed that the "big images" come from the imagination. I don't think they do. 
The imagination can be very banal. It is only when you enter into the gap 
between imagination and reason that you can create the enormous images that can 
change the way people see, understand and feel about the world. I say "see" 
because to see something in this context implies to understand it in the sense of 
feeling it and understanding it rationally. The gap is the area where we have to 
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start thinking rational concepts or rational ideas—thinking a rational idea about 
society. 
I will give you an example of what is, I think, a good TE image. Many people 
would say it is an image of the imagination. The romantics, Wordsworth, would 
say that is where you find truth intuitively. Really it is a TE—an image of 
imagination and reason. Caravaggio painted a picture of Christ being stopped on 
the road by one of his disciples who said "I don't think you are Christ" and Christ 
said "Yes I am. Put your hand in my side. " Christ has a hole in his side and St. 
Thomas puts out his fmger. And it is a wonderful picture because to put your 
finger into someone's side must be a very odd business. Christ and Thomas look 
squeamish: that's the social realism of the moment. And if you look at the wound 
in the side of Christ, and if you look at St. Thomas's jacket, there is a tear in it 
and they are exactly the same. Nobody in the picture notices it. The attention is 
given to the more obvious dramatic icon. Now I would use the torn rag, as I 
would use say a teacup or something—to say this picture isn't telling us something 
useful about God, but about people. What the painter is saying, and he might not 
have even been conscious of saying it, it might just have been his imagination 
telling him this, "actually, you should look at the other man too." Forget God, 
look at it from that more social, more human point of view. If I were living in 
a religious society and I understood this then it would, presumably, make me feel 
totally different about the next beggar I met or the next poor man. I am not 
saying that image is of any great use to us now in considering poverty but I think 
it is very interesting when you consider that it was painted in the sixteenth 
century. I would try to set up those tensions in a script and find a way of acting 
so that those tensions would always be made graphic and difficult for an audience. 
I don't think that theatre can provide solutions other than by making them possible 
and necessary in people's imaginations. That combines reason and imagination. 
What do you see as the importance of the writer? 
The ends of my plays are always beginnings. At the end of a Shakespeare play 
somebody comes in and wraps it up. He is usually in armour, or wears a crown. 
Authority is taking over. It has taken your imagination out for a walk and then 
in the end it takes it over because Shakespeare cannot risk anything else. That 
wouldn't work for us. We have to avoid closure of that sort. It's like somebody 
saying "What the beggar with the tear in his coat needs is a needle and cotton." 
I would say, "No, he needs a new society, a new world, a new way of being 
human. " 
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I think in the end one has to realize that it's risky to be alive. To live is to take 
a risk. And in the end we all die anyway. So the risk is, if you like, not worth 
taking. You are going to lose. But it is a risky business. In a good society it 
would be possible to say, to feel, to know. To say, "I could not bear to allow this 
to happen because it offends me too much as a human being. " You could be in 
a society where you could do that and not be taking a risk that would cost you 
everything. We are far too comfortable. We avoid these risks. Whilst I am 
talking kids are starving. Why am I sitting here drinking coffee? The only 
possible justification for that is that in whatever I do creatively I am going to tell 
the truth. I am going to work at that problem. If I feed that child the child might 
be able to grow up and believe in all sorts of dark spirits living in the jungle, or 
to go round shooting its enemies. I have given that child food and the child will 
live. It doesn't mean that I have closed that gap in the world between imagination 
and reason. That I have made it possible for us not to run the world in such a 
way that it's normal that children starve. The only possible justification for my 
writing is that I understand, or try to understand, that and to make the situation 
clearer. And that I produce the tools, plays, dramas, that will make people face 
those situations and come to understand them. 
Would you discuss your concept of theatre? 
I don't believe that the theatre is social realism, a slice of life. I am not trying 
to tell the truth about the play but about the audience. That is different. If I try 
to tell the truth on the stage I am simply trying to teach a lesson. And I don't 
think that imagination, that people, can be taught important lessons in that way. 
You can't be taught to be a human being. I presume Stanislavsky would want to 
know what was going on in a character and what his or her motivations were—that 
sort of question. Frankly, I am not terribly interested because in the end it is not 
helpful to us anymore. We know that human motivations are diverse and that we 
act for reasons that we don't fully understand. That often we are not guided by 
our reason. But reason provides us with excuses for what we do. So I am 
interested in a different series of questions and in a different relationship to an 
audience. That creates problems for actors. One can easily provide 
Stanislavskian explanations. What I want is to do something in the audience, 
something to happen in the auditorium. If I wrote "whodunits" I would never say 
who did it because it is of no great interest that something happens to fictional 
characters. Then we are allowing fictional characters to live our problems 
vicariously for us. I don't think that's good. A child if it's playing a game 
doesn't say well I'll sit here and you play my game for me. It needs to be 
involved in its game. I don't like audience active participation in plays. I think 
it is rubbish when an audience is allowed to choose the end, for instance. It is 
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just a trick. I want to make the audience accept responsibility for an actor's 
situation. I think all good theatre has in the end actually done this. I don't know 
that the average member of the audience really believes the end of Shakespeare's 
plays but they accepted it as being socially necessary at the time and may hope 
that it's still necessary. In any case the ends didn't work because although the 
kings restore order at the end of his plays, a few years later somebody chopped 
the king's head off. 
I think what I want to do on the stage is to make the situation vital and urgent for 
the audience. Now what I also need to do is to reassure the audience that they 
have the ability to deal with the situation. I don't want to simply chuck the 
situation at an audience and say "Get out of that. " That's not a proper communal 
use for theatre. I want it to be clear that people on the stage are struggling to 
understand their situation and I want the audience to take from the stage both the 
problem but also the ability of the actors on the stage to struggle with the 
problem. If the actors are struggling with the problem they push the problem 
further—it becomes a more critical and extreme problem, less of a nicely 
wrapped-up cliché. That can only be done through the demonstrated strength of 
the characters on the stage pushing the problem further and further and further. 
In order to do this characters on the stage have to have physical courage and 
intellectual energy. Otherwise the play will be like a doctor saying "I have 
diagnosed your problem for you." That's not a theatrical problem. If the 
characters on the stage have the energy and need to make them pursue justice then 
this commits the audience in a certain way. Some people say my plays are too 
long. But it takes time to pursue the problem. Beckett's plays got shorter 
because he was obsessed with the problem and despaired of solutions. Now if 
you are interested in pursuing the problem, the plays are not too long. We have 
to find ways of making the problem interesting over a larger span of time than is 
usual in the theatre nowadays. That means a different approach to acting. You 
have got to make the search for the solution more interesting than the problems. 
Otherwise you become a social hypochondriac. We talk about these things 
theoretically but what is needed at the moment is to find out the practicalities of 
what we are talking about. This sort of theatre is not purely theory and it's not 
something which is unobtainable. We need a theatre that can put meaning back 
into the audience. 
People say that I am talking about a serious solemn theatre but people want to be 
frivolous and happy. That's an appalling put down. When kids play they are 
enjoying themselves but they don't play at silly or frivolous things. On the 
contrary they take the most serious subjects and are fascinated and engaged. If 
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we lose the human skill of using our imagination profoundly and deeply in that 
way, then it's very dangerous because we still have to become artists, scientists 
and so on. If your house is burning down you don't say what a nice opportunity 
to make toast, you put the fire out. But I dislike pretentious theatre. A lot of 
theatre that takes itself very seriously in a bad way is empty theatre, because it's 
obsessed with the problems of survival—not with creativity. 
You said that you write your plays to show the audience the situation. If it's 
not necessary to know the motivation of the character from the 
psychological/Stanislavskian point of view, how can the audience know what 
the solution is if they do not experience the problem? 
You have to answer the Stanislavskian questions. They are legitimate. If the 
actor is playing Mike [in Oily's Prison] he will want to know why he murders his 
daughter.3 I can understand that question, and take it seriously, and try to provide 
an answer for the actor although I did not have to provide it for myself when I 
wrote the play. But then I want to say to the actor "Now you have discovered 
this, don't think you've solved the problem of how to act the play. All you're 
doing now is not solving that problem but opening the problem up for yourself. " 
How can we make this play useful for an audience? A play is a totality in that it 
doesn't at the end say "That is the problem and we've solved it." The particular 
problem is useful only as an instance of the total situation. Actors must use the 
total situation to illuminate the particular problem—not solve that problem 
individually: that's just survival. (At the end of Coffee the character says "I 
survived"—but he means more than that.)4 Drama ought to put what it means to 
be a human being on the stage and then you would take a particular 
problem/situation that would enable us to focus on/analyse what it means to be a 
human being. There is no solution to the problem of what it means to be a human 
being. There might be a solution to drug-taking, there might be a solution to 
playing truant. This is like saying "Well, pass your exams." It doesn't ask "but 
what does it mean to be a human being?" Schools have lessons in religion, and 
in citizenship, but I know of no school that has lessons in being a human being. 
And it seems such a fundamental thing that it is amazing that it is overlooked. 
It's like going to a school for hairdressing and no one ever gives you a pair of 
scissors. You feel that something fundamental is missing. So that it is no use 
going to see King Lear in order to be told that you die full of illusions. And 
rather fed up. The problem being posed by that play is something other than that. 
I want to set up situations that will say "What is the nature of being human, what 
sort of actions make you human and how do you understand the human situation? " 
If I have a just society then I have a less inhuman society. 
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I am trying to invoke in the audience something much more basic about what it 
means to be human. That is not necessarily to desire better conditions. It is to 
desire ajuster society. I presume ajuster society would have better conditions—it 
would be very odd if it didn't, I can't imagine how it would be just—but it is not 
the same question. It is more basic than the usual sociological explanations 
politics tends to provide. Brecht said you have got to provide the food and then 
people will be moral. It is not true. It is an oversimplification of the problem. 
Because the imagination could still be murderous, could still be destructive. 
Another sort of theatre would be needed. So I need to ask more fundamental 
questions because as a species, as a society, we need to ask them. If we don't 
what we then do is solve our problems by building more prisons, which is what 
Stalin did. 
Theatre has to return to its roots. People ask will Brecht's plays survive? All 
Brecht's plays are based on myths. Mother Courage—-it is a myth about a mother 
who loses her children. He has the security and the comfort of myths and then 
in a curious way he wants to turn the play around and uses the myth almost as 
propaganda to say that these people should have the land, tractors and so on. 
There is a tension between Brecht's plays and his theories. This creates a tension 
which is one of the play's strengths. It ensures they survive any seasonal declines 
in socialism. 
The surface of his plays is social observation. The events observe the characters 
as they are caught in the social, economic and political matrix. They show 
characters as being the expression of material determinism. Appearance as the 
product of ideology. Alienation is then used to expose appearance. Brechtian 
theatre is anti-fate. Yet it is based on economic determinism. There is a 
preliminary tension here. The characters are not presented as abstract, match-
stick people—products of statistics as in some of the writings of Piscator. This 
tension reflects the economic determinism of Marx's writings and their rhetorical 
moral tone. But statistics don't need theatre and determinism doesn't need moral 
persuasion. Of course, material determinism only works in the "last instance." 
The conclusion should be this: the plays present a structuralist appearance of 
things—and this is then alienated, to create a gap between the perceptions of the 
characters and the perceptions of the audience's. This approach isn't rigidly 
followed but it is one of the main theatrical tactics—but sometimes, for instance, 
the audiences' understanding is appealed to directly. The tactic raises many 
questions. If the audience is already alienated by its social practice, how can it 
be counter-alienated by theatre? 
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But the contradiction in Brecht's plays that I begin by referring to is that they are 
all based on myth. One example: Puntila is based on the old master-servant 
relationship found in Gilgamesh, Roman comedy, Figaro, Lear and his fool, 
Jeeves and Wooster and so on. The myth negotiates relationships of power and 
knowledge. The working out of the myth contains its own integration—its own 
integrity. The myth may be radicalized. But in Brecht the myth is not itself 
alienated. It lurks behind the alienation and holds the disjointed scenes together. 
There are two structures in Brecht's plays: the economic determinism (and the 
possibility of choice)—and the myth. In post-modernism the relationship between 
the operating rigidity of appearances and the myth has changed. Myth can no 
longer be used—consciously or otherwise—to integrate an attack, by alienation, 
on appearance. Brecht's alienation left the myth untouched. This smuggled in 
purpose and reason without examining—dramatizing—their causes. It is the ghost 
of Lao Tzu, which guards the frontier post. Reason is not allowed, in Brecht, to 
follow Lao Tzu through the barrier—into the gap. But that gap is where the 
questions of drama in the final instance come. It is not an unconcious in the 
accepted Freudian or biological sense. It is the hinterland of history—which is 
personal and social, economic and psychological, political and exegetic. Brecht 
alienates the appearance of things. I need to alienate the myth. Brecht alienates 
the structure of appearances by alienating the theatrical form—but leaving the 
myth intact. Brecht alienates appearance: that is, he appeals to the same structure 
of appearance that ideology uses—but rearranges it. If the myth is to be 
"alienated"—if our relationship to reality is to change—then the relationship 
between reality and myth must be changed. The elements of the myth can no 
longer lurk in the background or in the foundations: they must be brought into the 
world of appearance—our "real" world where we work, eat and are paid. This 
is the function of TE. We use the reality of appearances by intruding into it not 
another opinion—not a realignment of syllogisms—but the myth itself. This is not 
an appeal to the irrational. It's not even an appeal to the imagination. It is the 
expression of imagination and reason in each other's terms. In fact, all drama 
does this but with different priorities and aims. The TE alienates both the 
appearance of reality and myth. It does not rely on the obtrusiveness/ 
unobtrusiveness of myth but questions myth. If authority assumes and acts as if 
we were living in the post-enlightenment—then it will use myth in a more abrasive 
way than before. Myth is no longer codified into religion. It is made virulent. 
This brings authority into conflict with itself and makes the future more violent. 
In this situation appeals only to reason are ineffective. The TE goes beyond this 
by using the myth against itself: myth and reason mutually express each other. 
The TE works in the existing gap between reason and imagination. Otherwise 
reason will appropriate the myth as religion, mysticism, nationalism, ritual 
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etc.—the rational appropriation and subversion of the imagination: this reifies the 
imagination as the real and corrupts reason into the reaction. History is not so 
much the blind leading the blind as the blind dancing together. 
I think you cannot combine myths and authority in Brecht's way. Our times have 
to be much more radically deconstructed. I am not a deconstructive in the sense 
of thinking that there are no values. But I think theatre has to be more basic. I 
need to deconstruct the lurking myth. To take the reality of our situation and find 
the theatre in that. You cannot solve those problems by social realism. It has to 
be a return to a much more epic, total, dramatic theatre. We have to bring on the 
stage all the things that Ibsen and Chekhov could keep off the stage. It is said that 
the Greeks put their murders off stage because it might offend the audience. That 
wasn't the reason. They weren't shown on the stage because they were 
impractical. The actors wore masks and strange get-ups and you can't go around 
killing each other in these things. It wasn't that they weren't prepared to bring 
their murders on stage. They did something much more extreme—they brought 
their gods on stage. But Ibsen and Chekhov can't bring the murders on stage nor 
can they bring the Gods on stage. It is a deeply impoverished theatre. But I think 
we have to put these things on the stage—the gods and the killers. That means, 
why we kill and yet are moral. 
So you are suggesting that you call your theatre a theatre of use? 
There are three things that are important. I accept Stanislavsky and Brecht. I 
think my theatre incorporates them. It doesn't stop at either of those two things 
because it is interested in the gap which I think dehumanizes us between 
imagination and reason. If the gap becomes too large we become mad but, 
ordinarily, the gap is sufficiently large for us to become merely corrupt, although, 
in a sense, that is more dangerous because the mad we lock up but the corrupt we 
give power to. That is the premise of my theatre. In order to enter that gap we 
need something called use which is the exploitation or use of the elements you put 
on stage to point to the gap—and to show that it is peopled with fantasies. Fantasy 
is imagination trivialized and corrupted. It excludes reason. 
All life is alienated. You can't stop at theatrical alienation anymore. We have 
to go beyond alienation. But it would be a disaster if we collapsed back into 
Stanislavsky. In any staging you have to say to yourself "What is the TE of this 
particular moment?" or "What TE am I moving towards at this particular 
moment?" My plays build that in, anyway. You can't act them without the TE 
just as you can't act Brecht without alienation. Brecht's plays then collapse into 
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myth. The return in the staging of Brecht5s later plays, to the early Brecht, 
produces kitsch. 
I don't want to limit the actor. I want to turn the actor into a total artist. You go 
to the theatre to see the actor as artist. Actors are losing their artistry because 
they are not facing those problems. 
What are the realities facing a director? 
The art of directing, the whole business of directing, is the relationship with the 
actor. Its not the decor or the conception. We do it the wrong way round 
because of economic pressures. We design the set and then rehearse. The great 
theatres don't. They begin by working with the actors and trying to understand 
the play in that way. 
The Royal Court, when it was a great theatre, did not have a permanent group of 
actors but it had a company of actors who were Royal Court actors. They didn't 
appear in every play but they would be there pretty often. Out of that a common 
approach—attitude—to theatre was possible. Now actors are very isolated, very 
on their own, very anxious about their situation. They have no security. They 
learn how to survive in the situation and in the end that knowledge is destructive. 
For me, it is not a problem because I don't direct very often. My job is to write 
plays. I get involved in productions more than I want to because if I am not there 
terrible things happen. I don't think directors understand the sort of things I'm 
talking about. I think people don't go to the theatre now because they don't see 
the sort of theatre I am talking about. I am not talking about something elitist or 
dour or difficult. No, it's the stuff that's now put on that actually keeps people 
away from theatre. The English theatre—the R[oyal] S[hakespeare] Cfompany] 
and the [Royal] National Theatre—wouldn't exist if it wasn't for tourists—they go 
to it as they go to the zoo. It's on the itinerary. 
It's difficult to understand what it means to be yourself anymore. My feeling is 
that there will be a revival in theatre. Somebody has to create the possibilities of 
theatre. 
When there are a million TV channels nobody will look at any of them. People 
will want some other way of representing themselves. Theatre always recreates 
itself. But having said that, I do think there are real dangers. The power of 
technology is enormous and I think the control of imagination in society is now 
much more pervasive. For example, it is more difficult to be a heretic now than 
it once was. It is much easier to be a criminal. And this is not good news 
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because a heretic is a criminal of ideas; an ordinary criminal simply replicates the 
behaviour of society but in a cruder form. I think there are possibilities but this 
new form of theatre has to be created, it isn't there at the moment. As far as I 
can see it is becoming more difficult for actors. They need a different theatre. 
I'm not sure that many directors do. The commitment of an actor to the theatre 
is, in a way, more vital than the commitment of a director. This is because an 
actor has to go on and live it night after night. A director can be irresponsible 
and direct a play and not go and see it. Actors couldn't do that. There is a lot 
of bad acting around by good actors and a lot of bad directing by bad directors. 
You can become a director for the worst reasons. I think most actors become 
actors for good reasons. 
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